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Abstract—HTTPS is quickly rising alongside the need of
Internet users to benefit from security and privacy when accessing
the Web, and it becomes the predominant application protocol on
the Internet. This migration towards a secure Web using HTTPS
comes with important challenges related to the management of
HTTPS traffic to guarantee basic network properties such as
security, QoS, reliability, etc. But encryption undermines the
effectiveness of standard monitoring techniques and makes it
difficult for ISPs and network administrators to properly identify
and manage the services behind HTTPS traffic. This survey
details the techniques used to monitor HTTPS traffic, from the
most basic level of protocol identification (TLS, HTTPS), to the
finest identification of precise services. We show that protocol
identification is well mastered while more precise levels keep being
challenging despite recent advances. We also describe practical
solutions that lead us to discuss the trade-off between security
and privacy and the research directions to guarantee both of
them.
I. INTRODUCTION
The global trend toward an encrypted Web quickly made
HTTPS the dominant share of Web traffic [1]. According to
Cisco 2016 annual security report, statistics show that HTTPS
accounts for 57% of all Web traffic in October 2015 [2]. That
number is in line with ISPs: in Europe, French ISPs reported
that the amount of encrypted traffic reached 50% of the Internet
traffic in 2015 [3] against only 5% back in 2012, while another
ISP based in North America expects 65-70% of HTTPS traffic
by the end of 2016 [4]. There are multiple reasons behind this
migration towards HTTPS:
• The personalization of the Web and the concern of
users’ privacy and security [5].
• The development of cloud-based services (online stor-
age, backup-servers, etc.) that hold sensitive data [2].
• The wide spread of mobile applications, which gener-
ate inherently encrypted traffic [2].
• The arising of programs such as the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation’s ”Let’s Encrypt” that facilitate the
move toward HTTPS by a free, automated, and open
SSL Certificate Authority [4].
• The diffusion of high-speed Internet and the de-
velopment of hardware equipment natively handling
encryption to reduce computation overhead [6].
• The arising of Over-The-Top (OTT) content providers
that want to keep a maximum level of control over
their traffic by obfuscating to other actors [7].
On the one hand, moving towards secure web using HTTPS
allows users and content providers benefit from better security
and privacy. On the other hand, for ISPs and network ad-
ministrators, encryption makes them ”blind” to their network
traffic and curtails their capacity to perform proper network
management activities, such as traffic engineering, capacity
planning, performance/failure monitoring, or caching [8]. For
example, HTTPS prevents operators from applying QoS mea-
surements that give a priority to critical services, or to use
caching techniques to reduce network latency and conges-
tion. While from the security side, HTTPS makes security
monitoring methods unable to understand the traffic and to
identify anomalies or malicious activities that can be hidden
in encrypted connections [9]. Bortolameotti et al. [10] have
proposed indicators for malicious HTTPS connections that can
be used in Data Exfiltration scenario, where a compromised
enterprise’s machine transfers sensitive information to an ex-
ternal server controlled by an attacker over a HTTPS channel
to circumvent the security monitoring techniques. Therefore,
there is a high demand for solutions able to analyse HTTPS
traffic.
Previous surveys [11]–[14] are a valuable indicator to
understand the evolution of the Internet and how the academic
and industrial communities handle its traffic classification.
Table I summarizes the main traffic classification goal of these
published surveys. The most recent one by Velan et al. [14]
is focused on classification approaches for the identification
of encryption protocols over the Internet. They show that in
the past years, the classification of encrypted traffic in large
protocol categories such as IPsec, SSL/TLS, SSH, BitTorrent,
Skype, etc. has been widely investigated in the community.
They conclude that simply identifying encrypted traffic is not
enough but should be improved to identify the underlying
protocol. They also state that much work was conducted
on SSH while TLS should now be at the center of such
studies regarding its importance. In this survey, we take these
conclusions and even go deeper by focusing on a single type
of underlying protocol, HTTPS, while trying to go further in
the identification process to identify precise services. We think
that this focus is necessary because of the increased amount
and complexity of web applications and services run within
HTTPS traffic [1], [15], [16].
However, before performing such a deep traffic analysis,
the encryption protocol and the top-level application need to
be identified first [18]. In our survey, as illustrated in Figure
TABLE I: The published surveys in the field of traffic classification
Survey Covered Period Focus Publication year
Callado et al. [11] 2002-2008 Application identification 2009
Zhang et al. [17] 1994-2008 Identify P2P applications 2009
Valenti et al. [12] 2004-2013 Application identification 2013
Finsterbusch et al. [13] 2009-2013 Payload-based identification 2014
Velan et al. [14] 2005-2014 Encrypted traffic identification 2015
Fig. 1: Granularity of traffic classification
1, we propose a taxonomy of the related work based on
the necessary steps required to identify HTTPS services. We
first consider the identification of TLS among other traffic
types. Secondly we investigate the methods used to recognize
HTTPS, and we identify the web applications or services in a
third time. Our goal is to provide a complete view of HTTPS
traffic identification methods that can be used to apply network
management, and to identify the remaining research topics in
this area.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
The evolution of SSL and TLS protocols and an overview of
the protocol structure are presented in Section II. The identifi-
cation of TLS traffic is explored in Section III, while in Section
IV we present the relevant work for recognizing HTTPS
traffic. Section V provides a deeper view inside HTTPS traffic,
where specific web applications and services are identified.
Practical solutions for monitoring and filtering HTTPS traffic
are tackled in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the
survey with a discussion about the central question of privacy
when monitoring encrypted traffic and gives possible research
directions.
II. BACKGROUND ON TLS AND HTTPS PROTOCOLS
A. Protocol History
Nowadays, SSL and TLS protocols are known as the key
encrypted protocols over Internet. Those two names come from
the protocol history. At the end of 1994 Netscape included
the support of the second version of SSL (SSL 2.0) in
Netscape Navigator after solving many issues with the first
version which was just used inside Netscape Corporation. In
response, Microsoft also introduced in 1995 an encryption
protocol named Private Communication Technology (PCT)
that was very close to SSL 2.0 [19]. The publication of two
concurrent encryption protocols created a lot of confusion in
the security community, since applications needed to support
both for interoperability reasons. To resolve this issue, the
IETF formed a working group in 1996 to standardize a unified
TLS protocol. After a long discussion with the related parties,
the first version of standard protocol (TLS 1.0) appeared in
January 1999. In April 2006, the TLS protocol version 1.1
(TLS 1.1) was released, followed by TLS 1.2 in August 2008
which is specified in the RFC5246 [20] standard. The most
recent version of TLS is TLS 1.3, but is still a draft. The new
version has the same specifications but with improvements of
the encryption algorithms parameters and the handshake [21].
We will use the term TLS in the remainder of this survey.
B. Overview of TLS
TLS operates below the Application layer and above
Transport layer, as illustrated in Figure 2. TLS contains two
layers, the top-layer holds three protocols: (1) the Handshake
protocol is responsible for negotiation to establish or resume
a secure connection; (2) the Change Cipher Specification
manages the modifications in the ciphering parameters, such
as the ciphering algorithm; (3) the SSL Alert Protocol signals
problems with SSL connections and allows the communicating
peers to exchange alert messages. The lower-layer holds the
Record protocol, which can be presented as an envelope
for application data and TLS messages from the protocols
above. The Record protocol is responsible for splitting data
into fragments, which are optionally compressed, authenticated
with a Message Authentication Code (MAC), encrypted and
finally transmitted [19].
Fig. 2: The TLS Layers and sub-protocols
The Handshake protocol is of prime importance because it
defines the first interactions and is responsible for many con-
figuration aspects such as managing cipher suite negotiation,
server/client authentication, and session key exchange. During
cipher suite negotiation, client and server agree on a cipher
suite that will be used to exchange data. In authentication,
both parties prove their identity using Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) method. In the session key exchange, client and server
exchange random and special numbers, called the Pre-Master
Secret. These numbers are used to create their Master Secret,
which will be used as key for encryption in the phase of
exchanging data [19], [22]. Figure 3 details the sequence of
TLS Handshake protocol messages:
1) Client-Hello message contains the usable cipher
suites, supported extensions and a random number.
2) Server-Hello message holds the selected cipher, sup-
ported extensions and a random number.
3) Server-Certificate message contains a certificate with
the server public key.
4) Server-Hello-Done indicates the end of the Server-
Hello and associated messages. If the client receives a
request for its certificate, it sends a Client-Certificate
message.
5) Based on the server random number, the client gener-
ates a random Pre-Master Secret, encrypts it with the
public key given in the server’s certificate and sends
it to the server.
6) Both client and server generate a master secret from
the Pre-master secret and exchanged random values.
7) The client and server exchange ”Change cipher spec.”
to start using the new keys for encryption.
8) The client sends ”Client finished” message to verify
that the key exchange and authentication processes
were successful.
9) Server sends ”Server finished” message to the client.
Once both sides have received and validated the Finished
message from its peer, they can send and receive application
data over the new TLS connection.
Fig. 3: The TLS handshake protocol
C. Introduction to HTTPS protocol
HTTPS is a protocol providing secure web communica-
tions. It simply consists in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) running within a secured TLS connection. To dif-
ferentiate both services, HTTP uses the port 80 by default
while HTTPS uses the port 443. Encrypted-HTTP traffic is
still possible without HTTPS but is fundamentally different.
A user who needs privacy can still access the desired website
over VPN, SSH tunnel, ToR or SSL Proxy. In such case, the
website’s URL starts with ”http://”, which means that the web
server does not provide a secure connection by itself and that
the secure link parameters are configured within the chosen
method, but not in the remote server. In HTTPS, the website’s
URL starts with ”https://” and the website is hosted on an
authenticated server that owns a SSL certificate. Thus, client
and server negotiate the secure connection parameters before
exchanging data thanks to HTTP over a dedicated secure link
between them [23].
III. IDENTIFICATION OF TLS TRAFFIC
In this section, we review studies that detect TLS protocol’s
traffic among other types of encrypted traffic. We survey
the works providing a Boolean TLS classification method
(i.e., TLS vs. non-TLS). This is motivated by the need to
recognize the high-level protocol (TLS) before dealing with
sub-protocols running within. Later, we will consider that we
already have TLS traffic for the next fine-grained level of
identification. The relevant work to identify TLS traffic can
be grouped into three methods: port-based, protocol-structure
based and machine learning based.
A. Port-based method
Port-based method is a straightforward approach to identify
Internet applications and protocols, since the transport layer
port numbers are assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA). However, to identify TLS traffic effectively
it impossible to use only port-number, since the TLS protocol
is widely-used with many application layer protocols. For
instance, HTTPS, FTPS and SMTPS protocols use TLS over
port 443, 990, 465 respectively. Authors in [24] observe that
8% of non-TLS traffic use standard TLS ports, while 6.8%
of TLS traffic use ports not associated with TLS. This can
be explained by misconfigured web servers or users trying to
conceal their activities to avoid port-based filtering [25].
B. Protocol-Structure based method
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technique has been used
to identify TLS traffic by examining packets payload with
standard format of TLS protocol. The reviewed studies [6],
[24], [26], [27] share the idea of inspecting packets payload
for detecting TLS traffic based on the TLS Record Protocol
structure, as shown in Figure 2. The first five Bytes of the TLS
Record are:
• Byte [0] holds content type, as shown in Table IIIa.
• Bytes [1:2] holds protocol version. The values in
common use are showed in Table IIIb.
• Bytes [3:4] holds the length of encrypted payload.
TABLE II: TLS identification methods
Paper Features Method Accuracy Publish Year
Bernaille et al. [24] Port number Port-based - 2007
Bernaille et al. [24] Server-Hello packets
Protocol-Structure
100% 2007
Liu et al. [27] First 8 Packets 99.17% 2012
Finsterbusch et al. [13] DPI 100% 2014
Kim et al. [6] First 5 bytes 100% 2015
McCarthy et al. [25] Packet size, timing Machine learning 95% 2011
TABLE III: TLS Record first five bytes contents
(a) TLS Content Types
Type Hex
ChangeCipherSpec 0xl4
Alert 0xl5
Handshake 0xl6
Application 0x17
(b) TLS version
Version Hex
SSLv3 0x0300
TLS 1.0 0x0301
TLS 1.1 0x0302
TLS 1.2 0x0303
Bernaille et al. [24] are motivated to identify TLS traffic as
early as possible, so they use this format to detect Server-Hello
packets. As illustrated in Figure 3, the Server-Hello packet is a
part of the TLS handshake protocol and it sets the parameters
of the TLS connection (e.g., version and encryption algorithm).
Therefore, the presence of a valid Server-Hello is a strong
indication that the flow is a TLS one.
Authors in [6] propose a ”TLS Traffic Detector” to isolate
pure TLS flows, which are then used in more deep identifi-
cation to recognize services behind them. The TLS detector
compares the first 5 bytes of packets payload (i.e., Bytes [0:4]
as explained above) with the TLS record format to take a
decision. It benefits from the idea that TLS packet payloads
start with the same structure. So checking the first few bytes
of the payload for any packets in the flow (not just on the
Server-Hello packet as in [24]) is sufficient to mark a flow as
TLS.
Finsterbusch et al. [13] evaluate the OpenDPI 1 approach
that has been used for traffic identification based on DPI.
OpenDPI is able to classify TLS traffic with an accuracy of
100% by using the information in the TLS Record protocol
to identify TLS flows in two phases [27]. In the first phase,
it detects a packet which has one Record Protocol Structure
in the payload and the payload length is sufficient to read
the content type and the TLS version. In the second phase,
OpenDPI intercepts the next following packet in the reverse
direction, if it has one or more TLS Record protocol structures,
then OpenDPI marks that packet as TLS and it continues to
check all packets in both directions.
Liu et al. [27] present a method to detect TLS traffic, named
Double Record Protocol Structure Detection (DRPSD). They
need to avoid checking all packets to identify TLS traffic. The
DRPSD uses only 8 packets to recognize TLS traffic based on
detecting the format of TLS Record Protocol. Using a private
dataset, the accuracy comparison shows that the OpenDPI
achieves 87.69% accuracy and the DRPSD method has an
accuracy of 99.17%.
C. Machine learning based method
Machine learning is a type of artificial intelligence that
gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly
1https://github.com/thomasbhatia/OpenDPI
TABLE IV: Machine learning algorithms performance to iden-
tify TLS flows [25]
AdaBoost C4.5 Naive Bayes RIPPER
Accuracy 95.69% 85.13% 89.26% 82.59%
FPR TLS 0.04% 0.14% 0.11% 0.17%
FPR Non-TLS 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
programmed. The basic requirements are a training dataset
(i.e., solved examples), statistical features, algorithms and eval-
uation techniques. The learning process is divided into three
phases; Training, Classification and Validation. In training,
the statistical features and machine learning algorithms are
trained to make prediction. The output of training phase is
a model used in Classification phase to identify unseen data.
In Validation phase, the results of classification are validated
to measure the performance of the classification model [12].
Machine learning approach has an important advantage
related to its applicability to encrypted traffic. Encryption
motivates the usage of this approach to address the limitation of
legacy methods (i.e., IP address, port-based, DPI) to identify
TLS traffic. Thus, the flow statistics such as flow duration,
mean packet size, and mean inter-arrival time are used as
features to build a statistical profile for TLS protocol [28].
The feasibility of machine learning based method in the
context of recognizing TLS traffic was performed in [25].
Four machine learning algorithms (AdaBoost, C4.5, RIPPER
and Naive Bayesian) have been evaluated with 22 statistical
features (e.g., Mean, Standard deviation, Max, Min, etc.) for
the packet size and Inter-Arrival time. The classification results
are either Native-TLS, TLS-Tunneled, or Non-TLS. Table IV
presents accuracy and False Positive Rate(FPR) of the machine
learning algorithm for identifying TLS flows. The AdaBoost
algorithm achieves the highest accuracy with 95% of flows
classified correctly as TLS and a 4% False Positive Rate.
D. Summary
To summarize this section, we notice that the identification
of TLS is mainly handled by (1) using the TLS record format;
(2) employing machine learning approach over the encrypted
payload, as shown in Table II. Based on experimental results
given in the related work, we are able to recognize TLS
traffic among other types of encrypted traffic with a high
level of accuracy. Hence, it is possible to detect and identify
TLS traffic with high level of confidence and this is no
more a research topic. However, investigating protocols run
inside TLS is a totally different challenge. In the following
section, we overview the usage of TLS protocol for the HTTP
application with the goal of predicting exactly which TLS
flows hold HTTP traffic.
TABLE V: HTTPS identification methods
Paper Features Method Accuracy Publish Year
[5], [10], [16], [29]–[33] Port 443 Port based 100%* 2006-2016
Wright et al. [29] Packet size, timing, direction
Behaviour based
(KNN, HMM)
100%, 88% 2006
Haffner et al. [8] Keywords
Machine learning
99.2% 2005
Bernaille et al. [24] TLS-Format, First 5 packets size 85% 2007
Sun et al. [28]
TLS-Format, Packets (size, timing)
flow duration, Packets number
93.13% 2010
* If user not malicious (i.e., alter port number)
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF HTTPS TRAFFIC
Among applications that use TLS protocol, HTTP is the
most used one [14]. Hence, in this section we consider the
studies addressing the challenge of detecting HTTP traffic
inside TLS (i.e., HTTPS).
A. Port-based method
Basically, we can use the port-number 443 to identify
HTTPS traffic, but port 443 can also be used by malicious
applications to hide their activities behind the HTTPS port
to give an indication that a Web browsing traffic is running
[25]. Alternatively, some HTTPS Web server can be configured
to use a different port number [24]. Many approaches were
proposed to overcome the usage of non-standard port with
HTTPS, ranging from behaviour based method to machine
learning ones as described below. In spite of that, port 443
is widely used in the large body of literature [5], [10], [16],
[29]–[33] to collect and build HTTPS dataset for further
experiments.
B. Behaviour based method
Wright et al. [29] demonstrate how application behaviour
still can be used as a signature to identify the application,
even if its traffic is transmitted via HTTPS flows. They use
the fact that some information remains intact after encryption
like packet size, timing, and direction to identify the common
application protocols by using k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) and
Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The KNN detects HTTPS
flows with 100% accuracy and the HMM performs 88%
accuracy.
C. Machine learning based
Haffner et al. [8] propose extracting statistical signature
from the packet payload. In the case of unencrypted traffic
they extract ASCII words from the data stream as features.
But for HTTPS they extract words from the handshake phase,
since it is unencrypted as shown in Figure 3. The existence
and the location of such words in the first 64-Bytes of a
reassembled TCP data stream is encoded in binary vector and
used as input for different machine learning algorithms (Naive
Bayes, AdaBoost and Maximum Entropy). The evaluation over
dataset from ISP shows that AdaBoost identifies HTTPS traffic
with 99.2% accuracy.
Authors in [24], [28] share the concept of identifying
HTTPS in two steps; in the first step TLS traffic is detected
based on the protocol-format as discussed in section III-B,
while in the second step HTTP traffic in TLS channel is
recognized using machine learning method. In [34], authors
use the size of first five packets of a TCP connection to
identify HTTPS application with 81.8% accuracy rate. The
performance of their classifier has been improved (up to 85%)
in [24] by adding a pre-step phase, where they first detect
TLS traffic based on protocol-format and then identify the
HTTP traffic within TLS. Sun et al. [28] propose a hybrid
solution, which firstly detects TLS protocol by inspecting TLS
protocol-format, then apply a machine learning algorithm to
determine application protocols run with TLS connection. The
Naive Bayes algorithm is used with 8 statistical features; Mean,
Maximum, Minimum of packet length, and Mean, Maximum,
Minimum of Inter-Arrival time, flow duration and number of
packets. Using a private dataset, results show the ability to
recognize over 99% of TLS traffic and to detect HTTPS traffic
with 93.13% accuracy.
D. Summary
The related work in the identification of HTTP application
within TLS protocol, as illustrated in Table V, used different
methods with an acceptable level accuracy but each one
with its own built dataset that prevent others from having a
strong and fair comparison of their respective identification
accuracy. The situation will remain ambiguous in the absence
of a reference dataset for all. That leads to another research
question about reproducible-research and dataset construction
[14]. We should also question the representativity of dataset,
since HTTPS nowadays is a multi-purpose protocol (i.e., it
can deliver video, music, games, etc.). The next section delves
more into HTTPS application traffic itself, to identify the work
and the perspectives to name the specific web applications and
services that generate HTTPS traffic.
V. IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES INSIDE HTTPS
This section explores the methods, which precisely identify
the real source of HTTPS (i.e., Web services). The increased
complexity of web applications provides the ability to deliver
very different kinds of services such as email, games, online
storage, content providers, maps, social media plug-in, etc., all
transmitted via HTTPS flows [6], [16]. The identification of
HTTPS services is a serious challenge, since most of the legacy
techniques like DPI lose their power when facing encryption.
A. Website fingerprinting method
Identifying the accessed websites over secure connections
is well-known as Website Fingerprinting. This method is
presented in most of relevant work [35]–[38]. Cheng et al. [39]
propose one of the earliest method to identify the pages visited
by users over TLS connection by inspecting TCP/IP header,
which contains the size of payload and other information.
Their technique is based on calculating the size of a page
downloaded to browser, which is often unique among all files
in a given site. Moreover, as HTML files cannot be transmitted
concurrently with other files, they thus remain distinguishable.
At that time (i.e., 1998 and before) the browsers did not use
the HTTP Pipelining, which now hides the objects size and
order. Miller et al. [23] proposes a method to identify the
accessed page among 500 pages hosted at the same HTTPS
website based on clustering techniques to identify patterns in
traffic. Their results show the possibility to identify individual
pages from the same website accessed over HTTPS with 89%
accuracy. They successfully identify the home-page or internal-
pages from a website but at the cost of a specific learning at
a single website page level, while more effort is needed to
identity embedded services in web pages.
B. Behaviour based method
In [40], the authors develop a passive approach for webmail
traffic identification in HTTPS in order to understand the shift-
ing usage trend and mail traffic evolution. Three novel features
are proposed (1) service proximity: the presence of POP, IMAP
or SMTP server within a domain is a strong indication that
a mail sever exists; (2) activity profiles: mail system clients
access their e-mail frequently in a scheduled manner, so its
possible to build daily and weekly profile to such behaviour;
(3) periodicity: the usage of application timers like AJAX
technology to periodically (e.g., 5 minutes) check for new
messages creates high frequency time pattern and gives strong
indication the email service is running. These features are used
with Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm to differentiate
between mail and non-mail services within HTTPS flows. The
evaluation over dataset from ISP shows the ability to identify
HTTPS mail server with 93.2% accuracy.
Chen et al. [41] use the traffic pattern of the AutoComplete
function, which populates a list of suggested content with
each letter an user enters, such as Google and Yahoo search
engine. Despite HTTPS, this small amount of input data
causes state transitions in a web application, which can be
used to enumerate all possible inputs to match the triggered
traffic pattern. Based on real scenarios, they show how such a
method can be applied to leak out sensitive information (e.g.,
Search Keywords) from top online web applications. V. Berg.
[42] develops a tool that uses encrypted traffic patterns to
identify user activities over Google maps that already runs
over HTTPS. The tool collects satellite map tiles and builds a
database of the image sizes correlated with their (x,y,z)-triplets
coordinates. To identify the accessed region over Google maps,
the tool maps the size of images in HTTPS flow to (x,y,z)-
triplets and then clusters the results into a specific region.
As a proof of concept, the tool’s dataset has been configured
with city profiles, where it can correctly detect the transition
between such cities.
C. SSL certificate based method
SSL certificates, which are originally used to verify the
identities of servers and clients, are also used to recognize the
accessed service over HTTPS flows. Kim et al. [6] use the
certificate public information to build SSL/TLS Identification
Method (SSIM) to name the services behind HTTPS traffic.
The proposed method consists of three modules: (1) TLS Traf-
fic Detector module isolates pure TLS traffic before beginning
the service identification; (2) service signature module extracts
Certificate authority information, Server IP and Session ID
from a SSL certificate; (3) Session ID-IP-based Service Identi-
fier module recognizes non-identified flows from the previous
modules by finding relation between server IP and session ID.
Based on their experiments, they can classify 95% of TLS
traffic belonging to Google, Facebook and Kakaotalk with
about 90% accuracy for the corresponding services. Authors
in [10] use the information in SSL certificate like certificate
validity, release dates and the content of subject alternative
name as features to detect suspicious TLS traffic.
D. Protocol-Structure based method
One widely used technique to identify HTTPS service is
based on inspecting a field of TLS protocol header, namely
Server Name Indication (SNI), which has been recently im-
plemented in many firewall solutions and content filtering
solutions. The SNI is mainly used to allow a client to specify
the server hostname when the TLS negotiation starts, as shown
in Figure 3. The idea is using SNI to filter HTTPS traffic, since
it indicates the name of the remote service a client intends to
access. SNI provides the identification system with the power
to early abort the access to prohibited services.
Bortolameotti et al. [10] used both SNI and SSL certificate
information to detect malicious TLS connections by examining
(1) Levenshtein distance between the SNI and top 100 most
visited websites; (2) the structure of the server-name string
in SNI; (3) the format of the server-name string, which is a
DNS hostname format. In [43], authors evaluate the reliability
of identifying HTTPS based on SNI. They found two inherent
weaknesses, regarding (1) backward compatibility and (2) mul-
tiple services using a single certificate, which can be used by a
client to cheat the identification system. As proof of concept,
they develop a web browser plug-in to demonstrate how these
weaknesses can be practically used to bypass firewalls relying
on SNI to identify HTTPS traffic.
E. Machine learning based method
Recent work [16] argues that the page-level identification
is too fine-grained (i.e., Website Fingerprinting), specially in
the case of identifying content that is dynamically included
in other web pages (video, maps, etc.) Thus, they propose
a method for identifying HTTPS at service-level thanks to
a multi-level framework, without relying on specific header
fields, such as SNI that can be easily altered or the TLS
certificate information. The proposed framework uses machine
learning algorithms (Randomforest and C4.5) with a statisti-
cal profile library of intended HTTPS services. The profile
contains statistical measurements (Mean, variance, Max, Min,
etc.) over packets size and the inter-arrival-time over TLS
flow packets. For evaluation, real traffic collected from their
university network (i.e., private dataset) has been used. Their
multi-level framework can identify HTTPS web services with
93% accuracy.
F. Summary
Many recent approaches, as summarized in Table VI, intend
to identify HTTPS services based on the plain-text information
that appears in the TLS handshake phase or based on the
statistical signature of HTTPS web services. However, the
TABLE VI: Services identification inside HTTPS
Paper Features Method Level of Identification Accuracy Publish Year
Cheng et al. [39] Packet size and order
Website Fingerprinting
Internal pages 96% 1998
Miller et al. [23] Packets size and direction Internal pages 89% 2014
Schatzmann et al. [40]
Service proximity, activity profiles,
session duration, and periodicity
Behaviour based
Email services 94.8% 2010
Chen et al. [41] AutoComplete function traffic Search keywords - 2010
Vincent Berg [42] Images size Google maps activities - 2011
Kim et al. [6] Certificate information
SSL certificate
Services 90% 2015
Bortolameotti et al. [10] Certificate information Services 100%* 2016
Shbair et al. [43] SNI
Protocol Structure
Services 100%* 2015
Bortolameotti et al. [10] SNI Malicious connections 100%* 2015
Shbair et al. [16] SNI, packets size and timing profile Machine learning Services 93% 2016
* If user not malicious (i.e., alter SNI)
reliability of handshake information for identification still need
improvement, as discussed with SNI and SSL certificate. While
the reliability of machine learning method has a challenge
with the increased complexity of web applications that can
be easily extended with new functionalities that may change
the application behaviour and the statistical-signature. This
complexity creates an overhead to the machine learning based
identification methods to re-evaluate their statistical features
and re-train classification models regularly to keep their meth-
ods effective with updated changes.
The related work that can precisely name the service behind
HTTPS flow are mainly depends on the offline/passive analysis
where full HTTPS flows available for training and classifi-
cation. However, the offline analysis is less critical to the
training time duration, computation overhead and classification
error over time. That opens a research question about the real-
time identification of HTTPS services. The existence of real-
time detection will help ISPs and administrators to manage
HTTPS services at the right time, and perform the proper
network management activities. The side question is to know
how currently the HTTPS traffic is monitored and filtered. The
answer to this question is presented in the next section.
VI. PRACTICAL HTTPS MONITORING AND FILTERING
Once HTTPS traffic is identified then it can be monitored
and filtered. Monitoring is defined as recording all activities
on a network (URLs visited, session duration, bandwidth,
etc.) and generating a report that can be used for network
management. Some of current HTTPS monitoring approaches
use similar techniques than research papers. For example, some
monitoring approaches rely on the information exchanged
during handshake such as: SSL certificates [30], [31], the
handshake interactions sequence [44] and the most recent is
SNI-based monitoring [43], which has been implemented in
solutions as Clavister Web Content Filtering and Sophos Uni-
fied Threat Management (UTM) to monitor accessed websites
over HTTPS flows [43]. HTTPS filtering is intended to restrict
access by intercepting the transmitted date between a client and
server [45]. Hence, to deploy HTTPS filtering two approaches
have been presented: HTTPS proxy server and acquiring TLS
encryption keys.
A. HTTPS Proxy Server
A proxy server is a server acts as a man in the middle to
processes and forwards clients requests towards servers. How-
ever, when HTTPS is used the proxy server cannot directly
access data transmitted via HTTPS, so it pretends to be the
intended remote server then it establishes a secure connection
to the real server. As shown in Figure 4, when a client connects
to the remote server via a HTTPS proxy the client connects to
the proxy server, which plays the role of a destination server by
providing its own SSL certificate. Then the proxy establishes
another secure connection with the real remote server. By this
method all encrypted web traffic is open to the proxy in clear
at the expense of users’ privacy [43].
Fig. 4: HTTPS Proxy Server
Existing commercial solutions such as Forefront Threat
Management Gateway (TMG) 2010 uses the HTTPS proxy
method for HTTPS inspection, which acts as a trusted man-
in-the-middle instead of just tunnelling HTTPS connection
blindly [46]. Also the FireEye product uses the proxy model
to provide visibility into untrusted TLS traffic. The product is
designed to intercept and forward all desired network traffic
for temporarily decrypting, examining and then re-encrypting
TLS sessions again. The FireEye argues this method responds
to the growing number of cyber criminals that use TLS as a
cover to get inside organizations and persist undetected [47].
B. Acquiring TLS encryption key
There are at least two methods for acquiring the decryp-
tion keys, the Key-Recovery mechanism and the cracking
of encryption algorithms. In [48] author describe the Key-
Recovery mechanism or ”Key escrow”, where all encryption
keys are stored in a trusted third party, such as government,
or designated private entities. The third party has the right
to access keys for authorized law enforcement purpose. As a
result, a government may limit access to HTTPS websites that
refuse sharing their TLS keys with the escrow system [45].
However, cracking encryption algorithms is different from
the preceding ones, as it needs high computation power to
be able to crack the encryption. A method for cracking is
using a flaw in the mathematical algorithm used to encrypt
data, such as the factorization of widely used public-key
cryptosystems. For instance, RSA 768-bit can be broken with
a state of the art algorithm and a high computation power [49].
Adrian et al. [50] evaluated the security of Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, where they found that 82% of vulnerable servers use
a single 512-bit group, which makes it possible to compromise
connections of 7% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites.
VII. CONCLUSION
HTTPS is quickly becoming the predominant application
protocol on the Internet. It answers to the need of Internet
users to benefit from security and privacy when accessing
the Web. But the increasing amount of HTTPS traffic comes
with challenges related to its management to guarantee basic
network properties such as security, QoS, reliability, etc. The
encryption undermines the effectiveness of standard monitor-
ing techniques and makes it difficult for ISPs and network
administrators to properly identify services behind HTTPS
traffic and to properly apply network management operations.
This survey provides a focused view of HTTPS traffic iden-
tification method, starting from the identification of the lower-
level TLS protocol to the precise identification of HTTPS
services. We have found that efficient methods exploiting the
standard structures of the TLS protocol are able to identify TLS
traffic among other types with a high level of accuracy and are
no more a research topic. The identification of HTTPS uses
different methods with an acceptable level of detection rate, but
the confusing matter is the representativity and the diversity
of dataset, which prevent any strong and direct comparison
of their respective identification accuracy. This leads to im-
portant research questions about reproducible research and the
best practices for HTTPS dataset construction and diffusion.
Finally, based on the most recent works, we show that some
efforts were made to discriminate between services running
within HTTPS traffic. While the results are encouraging, most
solutions still suffer from significant drawbacks ranging from
the specialized identification of a precise application (webmail,
maps, etc.) to the inability to operate in real time.
In the previous section of this survey, we noticed that
there is a very efficient method to monitor and control HTTPS
traffic based on HTTPS proxy. This easy solution has many
supporters from National Security Agencies [51] to security
companies [47], and is even discussed for future Internet
technical standards [52]. However, such a method cannot be
treated lightly as it denies the right for privacy for the sake
of traffic inspection and therefore creates a paradox between
the need for security and users’ privacy. The answer to this
conflict is not easy, as both sides may have valuable arguments.
After the Snowden affair, this issue is known as ”Dilemmas
of the Internet age” and has been discussed not only in the
academic community but in the overall society and human
rights space. Authors in [53] claim that large-scale monitoring
is ineffective as it is only able to identify trivial crimes,
but cannot recognize professional criminals or persons well
educated in working under surveillance. Another important
question is how to guarantee that an administration in power
will never abuse the intercepted information to intimidate its
opponents. Authors conclude that if online monitoring may
fix some problems, it can create even more serious ones. In
another domain, even if enterprise owners may have good
arguments for monitoring and filtering access to their network
for security, productivity or responsibility reasons [54], it may
not be sufficient to legitimate the exposition of employees
private data with HTTPS proxy.
In conclusion, while challenging, we think that the identifi-
cation of HTTPS services without decryption is the way to go
to provide a viable compromise between the needed network
knowledge to ensure proper management and users’ privacy.
The research community should focus on proposing new
identification techniques offering both security and privacy.
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